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Cross-platform browser artifact and credential extractor for red team engagements, penetration tests and DFIR work.

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crumble

Extract the crumbs browsers leave behind.

crumble is a cross-platform browser artifact and credential extractor for authorized red team engagements, penetration tests and DFIR work. It enumerates installed browsers and profiles, then extracts (and, where the platform allows, decrypts) stored logins, cookies, payment cards, OAuth tokens, autofill, history, downloads, bookmarks and extensions.

Supported browsers: Chrome, Edge, Brave, Chromium, Opera, Vivaldi, Firefox (+ Safari inventory on macOS). Supported platforms: Windows, macOS, Linux.

Warning

Only run crumble on systems you are explicitly authorized to assess. Extracting credentials and session tokens you do not own is illegal in most jurisdictions. The authors do not condone unauthorized use.

What it does

  • Discovery: finds browser installs and profiles across all interactive users (on Windows, elevated runs see every user's hive, not just the operator's).
  • Decryption:
    • Windows: Chromium v10 (DPAPI) and v20 (App-Bound Encryption) blobs. ABE unwrap goes through the browser's own IElevator COM elevation service, invoked from inside a suspended instance of the browser itself ("same-image" execution), so the service's caller validation passes.
    • macOS: Chromium v10 via the login Keychain "Safe Storage" secret, read only when the login keychain is already unlocked (it never triggers the system unlock dialog).
    • Linux: legacy v10 via the well-known hardcoded key; keyring-wrapped v11 values are reported unsupported.
    • Firefox: logins via the per-profile key4.db master key (SHA1/HMAC-3DES PBE on legacy profiles, PBES2 with PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 and AES-256-CBC on Firefox 75 and later). Profiles protected by a master password, and pre-Firefox 58 key3.db profiles, are reported as unavailable. Cookie values are plaintext.
  • Clean reads: live databases are never opened in place. Every store is byte-copied (with WAL sidecars) into a private, owner-only temp directory under a neutral name and queries run against the copy.
  • Operator-configurable OPSEC: decryption and in-browser extraction can be skipped outright (--no-decrypt) or made EDR-aware (--respect-edr skips intrusive key retrieval when an EDR/AV product is detected).

Everything a store yields is emitted: there is no post-collection field filtering. Your selection decides what is attempted; the output reports what was actually collected.

Usage

$ crumble --help
# Everything it can find, decrypted, pretty JSON on stdout
$ crumble

# Same, one record per line
$ crumble --format jsonl > crumbs.jsonl

# One browser, one artifact class, last 30 days, max 100 rows per class
$ crumble -b firefox -a history --history-days 30 --max-items 100

# Inventory and counts only: no keychain read, no DPAPI/ABE unwrap,
# no in-browser extraction
$ crumble --no-decrypt

# Cautious engagements: skip intrusive key retrieval if EDR/AV is present
$ crumble --respect-edr

Configuration

All configuration is command-line flags (repeatable flags stack). Selection is fail-closed: a browser or artifact name that matches nothing known makes the whole selection match nothing, rather than widening to "all".

flag default meaning
-b, --browser <id> all detected target browser: chrome edge brave chromium opera vivaldi firefox safari
-a, --artifact <id> all artifact class: profiles credentials history downloads cookies autofill bookmarks extensions (credentials also covers payment cards, IBANs and OAuth tokens)
--decrypt / --no-decrypt --decrypt resolve master keys and decrypt secret values; --no-decrypt collects counts and plaintext artifacts only: no Keychain read, no DPAPI/ABE unwrap, no in-browser extraction
--respect-edr / --no-respect-edr --no-respect-edr with --respect-edr, skip intrusive key retrieval (process manipulation on Windows, the Keychain read on macOS, the DPAPI unwrap) when an EDR/AV product is detected; counts are still collected
--history-days <n> 0 (all) limit history/download lookback to the last n days
--max-items <n> 0 (unlimited) cap rows emitted per artifact class across the whole run; per-store counts always reflect the full store
--format <json|jsonl> json output format

Notes on the knobs:

  • --no-decrypt is the fast, quiet mode: profile inventory, exact counts, plaintext artifacts (history, downloads, bookmarks, extensions, Firefox cookies) and credential-store rows with sealed values. It performs zero key retrieval.
  • --respect-edr exists so an authorized operator can avoid reading as an infostealer to the customer's SOC during sensitive engagements. When it triggers, the run's key_status reports exactly which products were seen.
  • --max-items caps the row sample, never the exposure counts. The counts are the finding.
  • The macOS Keychain read happens only on the decryption path and only when the login keychain is already unlocked; a locked keychain (or a denied per-item ACL) is reported as unavailable in key_status, never prompted.

Output

One JSON report (or JSONL: a summary record, then one record per row with a kind discriminator). Top-level sections:

  • profiles: one summary per profile (display name, path, exact per-store counts (credential_count, cookie_count, history_count).
  • credentials, cookies, credit_cards, iban_entries, oauth_tokens and autofill: the secret/payment classes. password_stored and the card ciphertext number_enc are the always-present exposure proofs; decrypted values are empty when no key resolved.
  • history, downloads, bookmarks and extensions: the plaintext classes.
  • findings: one per browser, a counts-only exposure summary with severity (medium when decryptable secret material is present, low when a store existed but could not be read, else info).
  • key_status: per-browser master-key outcome (abe, dpapi, keychain, key4, peanuts, not-applicable: …, unavailable: …, error: …).
  • collection_errors: store-level failures as browser/profile/store: reason; an unreadable store is recorded, never reported as empty.

Building

$ cargo build --release

Pure Rust dependencies (SQLite is compiled from source); the Windows build adds windows-sys. Cross-compile with cargo-zigbuild/cross as usual:

$ cargo zigbuild --release --target x86_64-pc-windows-msvc
$ cargo zigbuild --release --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu

FAQ

Is this an infostealer? It is the same primitive, operated under authorization: it reads what browsers store locally for their own user. Every such machine is readable by software running as that user. That is the finding crumble is built to demonstrate to a customer.

Why are some Firefox logins sealed? Either the profile has a master password set (the empty-password key derivation fails the built-in password check), or the profile predates Firefox 58 and still uses key3.db (Berkeley DB, unsupported). Both are reported in key_status and collection_errors; every other Firefox login decrypts.

Why does macOS report the key as unavailable? The login keychain is locked or its per-item ACL denied the read. crumble never triggers Keychain UI; an unlocked keychain (or an ACL grant) is required.

What happens when Chrome's elevation service rejects the unwrap? The in-browser attempt is recorded as an error in key_status and the run falls back to plaintext stores; it never degrades to reading the stores from the wrong identity.

Legal

Use responsibly and only under authorization covered by your engagement's rules of engagement and applicable law. You are liable for your own compliance. See LICENSE.

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Cross-platform browser artifact and credential extractor for red team engagements, penetration tests and DFIR work.

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