Extract the crumbs browsers leave behind.
crumble is a cross-platform browser artifact and credential extractor for
authorized red team engagements, penetration tests and DFIR work. It
enumerates installed browsers and profiles, then extracts (and, where the
platform allows, decrypts) stored logins, cookies, payment cards, OAuth
tokens, autofill, history, downloads, bookmarks and extensions.
Supported browsers: Chrome, Edge, Brave, Chromium, Opera, Vivaldi, Firefox (+ Safari inventory on macOS). Supported platforms: Windows, macOS, Linux.
Warning
Only run crumble on systems you are explicitly authorized to assess.
Extracting credentials and session tokens you do not own is illegal in most
jurisdictions. The authors do not condone unauthorized use.
- Discovery: finds browser installs and profiles across all interactive users (on Windows, elevated runs see every user's hive, not just the operator's).
- Decryption:
- Windows: Chromium
v10(DPAPI) andv20(App-Bound Encryption) blobs. ABE unwrap goes through the browser's ownIElevatorCOM elevation service, invoked from inside a suspended instance of the browser itself ("same-image" execution), so the service's caller validation passes. - macOS: Chromium
v10via the login Keychain "Safe Storage" secret, read only when the login keychain is already unlocked (it never triggers the system unlock dialog). - Linux: legacy
v10via the well-known hardcoded key; keyring-wrappedv11values are reported unsupported. - Firefox: logins via the per-profile
key4.dbmaster key (SHA1/HMAC-3DES PBE on legacy profiles, PBES2 with PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 and AES-256-CBC on Firefox 75 and later). Profiles protected by a master password, and pre-Firefox 58key3.dbprofiles, are reported as unavailable. Cookie values are plaintext.
- Windows: Chromium
- Clean reads: live databases are never opened in place. Every store is byte-copied (with WAL sidecars) into a private, owner-only temp directory under a neutral name and queries run against the copy.
- Operator-configurable OPSEC: decryption and in-browser extraction can
be skipped outright (
--no-decrypt) or made EDR-aware (--respect-edrskips intrusive key retrieval when an EDR/AV product is detected).
Everything a store yields is emitted: there is no post-collection field filtering. Your selection decides what is attempted; the output reports what was actually collected.
$ crumble --help# Everything it can find, decrypted, pretty JSON on stdout
$ crumble
# Same, one record per line
$ crumble --format jsonl > crumbs.jsonl
# One browser, one artifact class, last 30 days, max 100 rows per class
$ crumble -b firefox -a history --history-days 30 --max-items 100
# Inventory and counts only: no keychain read, no DPAPI/ABE unwrap,
# no in-browser extraction
$ crumble --no-decrypt
# Cautious engagements: skip intrusive key retrieval if EDR/AV is present
$ crumble --respect-edrAll configuration is command-line flags (repeatable flags stack). Selection is fail-closed: a browser or artifact name that matches nothing known makes the whole selection match nothing, rather than widening to "all".
| flag | default | meaning |
|---|---|---|
-b, --browser <id> |
all detected | target browser: chrome edge brave chromium opera vivaldi firefox safari |
-a, --artifact <id> |
all | artifact class: profiles credentials history downloads cookies autofill bookmarks extensions (credentials also covers payment cards, IBANs and OAuth tokens) |
--decrypt / --no-decrypt |
--decrypt |
resolve master keys and decrypt secret values; --no-decrypt collects counts and plaintext artifacts only: no Keychain read, no DPAPI/ABE unwrap, no in-browser extraction |
--respect-edr / --no-respect-edr |
--no-respect-edr |
with --respect-edr, skip intrusive key retrieval (process manipulation on Windows, the Keychain read on macOS, the DPAPI unwrap) when an EDR/AV product is detected; counts are still collected |
--history-days <n> |
0 (all) |
limit history/download lookback to the last n days |
--max-items <n> |
0 (unlimited) |
cap rows emitted per artifact class across the whole run; per-store counts always reflect the full store |
--format <json|jsonl> |
json |
output format |
Notes on the knobs:
--no-decryptis the fast, quiet mode: profile inventory, exact counts, plaintext artifacts (history, downloads, bookmarks, extensions, Firefox cookies) and credential-store rows with sealed values. It performs zero key retrieval.--respect-edrexists so an authorized operator can avoid reading as an infostealer to the customer's SOC during sensitive engagements. When it triggers, the run'skey_statusreports exactly which products were seen.--max-itemscaps the row sample, never the exposure counts. The counts are the finding.- The macOS Keychain read happens only on the decryption path and only when
the login keychain is already unlocked; a locked keychain (or a denied
per-item ACL) is reported as
unavailableinkey_status, never prompted.
One JSON report (or JSONL: a summary record, then one record per row with a
kind discriminator). Top-level sections:
profiles: one summary per profile (display name, path, exact per-store counts (credential_count,cookie_count,history_count).credentials,cookies,credit_cards,iban_entries,oauth_tokensandautofill: the secret/payment classes.password_storedand the card ciphertextnumber_encare the always-present exposure proofs; decrypted values are empty when no key resolved.history,downloads,bookmarksandextensions: the plaintext classes.findings: one per browser, a counts-only exposure summary with severity (mediumwhen decryptable secret material is present,lowwhen a store existed but could not be read, elseinfo).key_status: per-browser master-key outcome (abe,dpapi,keychain,key4,peanuts,not-applicable: …,unavailable: …,error: …).collection_errors: store-level failures asbrowser/profile/store: reason; an unreadable store is recorded, never reported as empty.
$ cargo build --releasePure Rust dependencies (SQLite is compiled from source); the Windows build
adds windows-sys. Cross-compile with cargo-zigbuild/cross as usual:
$ cargo zigbuild --release --target x86_64-pc-windows-msvc
$ cargo zigbuild --release --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnuIs this an infostealer? It is the same primitive, operated under
authorization: it reads what browsers store locally for their own user.
Every such machine is readable by software running as that user. That is
the finding crumble is built to demonstrate to a customer.
Why are some Firefox logins sealed? Either the profile has a master
password set (the empty-password key derivation fails the built-in
password check), or the profile predates Firefox 58 and still uses
key3.db (Berkeley DB, unsupported). Both are reported in key_status
and collection_errors; every other Firefox login decrypts.
Why does macOS report the key as unavailable? The login keychain is
locked or its per-item ACL denied the read. crumble never triggers
Keychain UI; an unlocked keychain (or an ACL grant) is required.
What happens when Chrome's elevation service rejects the unwrap? The
in-browser attempt is recorded as an error in key_status and the run falls
back to plaintext stores; it never degrades to reading the stores from the
wrong identity.
Use responsibly and only under authorization covered by your engagement's rules of engagement and applicable law. You are liable for your own compliance. See LICENSE.